Fair Fines, Smarter Policing: The Case for Income-Based Penalties in Out-of-Court Resolutions

By Andy Bartlett, AdventFS LTD

As police forces across the UK face increasing demands and diminishing resources, the need for proportionate, efficient responses to low-level offending has never been greater.  However, some entities continue to resist the implementation of an offender pays model, this may in part lie in a failed experiment modelled on the German system, known as Tagessätze, which assigns a number of daily units for the offence (between 5 and 360) and multiplies them by the offender’s net daily income. For example, a fine for shoplifting might be 30 units at €30/day for a low-income offender, or €100/day for a high earner making the penalty equally impactful.

The "day-fine" model, most notably used in Germany, Sweden, and Finland, determines financial penalties based on two factors: the seriousness of the offence and the offender's daily disposable income (Kilchling, 2005). This ensures that the fine has equivalent punitive weight regardless of socioeconomic status.

Germany saw a 90% drop in short custodial sentences in the decade after implementing day-fines (Kilchling, 2005), showing how financial penalties, when proportionate and enforced, can effectively replace court-based sanctions. In Finland, a 2024 study by Kaila used regression-discontinuity analysis to evaluate the deterrent effect of income-based speeding fines. The study found that a €200 increase in fine (linked to income) led to a 15% reduction in reoffending within six months, highlighting the potential of tailored penalties to change behaviour.

The United Kingdom's brief trial of income-linked fines from 1991 to 1993 failed, primarily due to inadequate implementation and adverse media coverage. Notable cases where substantial fines were imposed on affluent offenders were portrayed as unreasonable and inequitable, prompting a political withdrawal. Furthermore, lay magistrates, who were uneasy with the rigidity of formulaic sentencing, favored the discretion and straightforwardness offered by traditional flat fines (Sanders & Young, 2000).

However, the research from the United Kingdoms attempt to implement a similar model did highlight that Proportional fines may be more successfully deployed outside the courtroom, where flexibility, discretion, and victim collaboration are more available than the rigid court structure.

One underexplored solution lies in the adoption of income-based financial penalties within out-of-court resolution (OoCR) frameworks. Inspired by continental Europe's "day-fine" systems, this approach can alleviate burdens on frontline officers, promote equity, and reduce unnecessary prosecutions if implemented with care.  UK police forces are under acute strain from increased case complexity, court backlogs, and staff shortages. The pressure to divert suitable cases out of the formal system is growing.

The College of Policing has emphasised the value of community resolutions and conditional cautions, particularly for first-time and low-level offenders, yet many forces still wrangle with the concept that the offender should either pay for the intervention or contribute towards compensating the victim.

There are some forces such as Staffordshire and Lincolnshire Police who have either moved towards an offender pays model or are considering implementing one, and early indications from Staffordshire Police are that compliance need not suffer, when the model is based on a proportionate sanction, balanced with a rehabilitative intervention.

Police services cannot profit from an offender pays model, but certainly the proportionate sanction for minor offences adjusted for by weekly income could be used as part of a social equity fund by OPCC offices to ensure that the ability to access diversionary programs is not hampered by the ability to pay.  This model already exists within the Magistrates courts system but isn’t strictly monitored or adhered to.  The two-tier framework provides an opportunity to:

1. A) Resolve cases faster. B) Promote fairness and give victims a voice in an outcome that meets their needs. C) Deter future offending. D) Reduce the risk of unnecessary court escalation

Current UK practice largely relies on fixed penalties that do not account for ability to pay. This creates two major issues:

1. Inequality of impact: £100 is a crushing burden for some and a trivial inconvenience for others.

2. Reduced deterrence: For high-income offenders, low fines are unlikely to influence behaviour (Cavadino & Dignan, 2006).

This undermines both the fairness and effectiveness of sanctions. It can also increase fine default rates, which in turn require more enforcement time from already-stretched forces. Importantly, such systems must be framed clearly to the public and media. The failure of the 1990s unit fine trial was as much about perception as substance. Communication should emphasise that equity isn't leniency it’s smart, responsive justice.

If developed thoughtfully, proportional fines within OoCRs could promote behaviour change, reduce workloads, and restore public confidence in the justice system. For overburdened police services, that’s an idea worth backing.

References

• Cavadino, M. and Dignan, J., 2006. Penal systems: A comparative approach. London: SAGE.

• Hillsman, S.T., 1990. Fines and day fines. Crime and Justice, 12, pp.49–98.

• Kaila, M., 2024. Financial penalties and repeat speeding: Evidence from Finland. Helsinki: Helsinki Institute of Criminology.

• Kilchling, M., 2005. Day-fines: International developments and standards. Freiburg: Max Planck Institute.

• Sanders, A. and Young, R., 2000. Criminal justice in England and Wales. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 20(4), pp.633–660.

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